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Salinity Control and the Riparian Right
Marcia J. Steinberg* and Michael Schoenleber**
INTRODUCTION
Water in the Delta meanders through hundreds of miles of chan-
nels; some water flows out of the Delta toward the Bay, some is
used in the Delta, and some is pumped by the two projects from the
southern Delta for export.' A portion of the water that flows through
the Delta is released from upstream storage reservoirs operated by
the United States2 and the State of California.3 It is this water
resource, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, that has been the focal
point, physically, politically and legally, of California's water re-
source controversies for the last two decades. 4
* Marcia J. Steinberg is an attorney with the California Department of Water Resources.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and in no way reflect the views,
opinions or policies of the Department of Water Resources, or any other agency of the State
of California.
** Michael Schoenleber is an attorney in private practice in Sacramento, California.
1. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 98-
100, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166-67 (1986).
2. The United States Bureau of Reclamation operates the Federal Central Valley Project
which stores water from the Sacramento, Trinity and American Rivers in various reservoirs.
Water released from these reservoirs enters the Sacramento River and eventually flows into
the northern part of the Delta.
3. The California Department of Water Resources operates the State Water Project
which stores water from the Feather River in Oroville Reservoir. Water released from Oroville
Reservoir enters the Feather River, flows into the Sacramento River, and then flows into the
northern part of the Delta.
4. The Peripheral Canal, originally proposed by the Department of Water Resources and
the Bureau of Reclamation in 1966, is illustrative of the controversy. The Canal was proposed
to transport water around the Delta to the Project pumping plant in the southern Delta and
to remedy reverse flow problems. In 1980, the Legislature passed the State Administration's
Peripheral Canal proposal, Sentate Bill 200, but the voters rejected it in a June, 1982,
referendum.
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The controversy surrounding the Delta continues today.' One legal
issue stands out-how to properly allocate the Delta waters so as to
meet Delta rights and those rights upstream and downstream from
the Delta. At the core of this issue is the extent of water rights held
by water users in the strategically-located Delta. This article explores
the riparian rights in the Delta and discusses the extent to which the
Delta riparian right entitles the water right holder to a degree of
water quality protection, specifically, salinity control. To understand
California's water resource controversies, one must understand the
Delta, the Delta riparian right, and the critical characteristic of the
riparian right 6-the right to salinity control.
THE DELTA
The Delta is at the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin
Rivers. These rivers drain over forty percent of the area of the State.
The Delta receives water flowing naturally from the two major rivers
and other rivers and streams, water imported to the watershed from
the Trinity River by the United States as part of the Federal Central
Valley Project, and water stored in upstream reservoirs constructed
by the United States, the State, and local agencies. Water flows
through the Delta, Suisun Bay, San Francisco Bay, and on out to
the Pacific Ocean.
Most of the Delta lowlands are situated at or below sea level. As
a result, it is generally conceded that Delta water users have riparian
water rights. Being situated at or below sea level, the Delta is affected
by the ocean tides which bring water with high levels of ocean salts
into these Delta lands. Water of higher salinity is repelled by the
movement of upstream fresh water through the Delta toward the
ocean. Salinity levels in the Delta are constantly changing, depending
on the tides, winds, fresh water outflows and Delta use.7 This article
analyzes the Delta riparian right to water quality in the form of
5. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). The State Water Resources Control Board received judicial direction
in this case and in 1986 convened the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
Estuary Hearing (Bay-Delta Hearing) to adopt a Water Quality Control Plan and a Water
Rights Decision applicable to the Delta. Id.
6. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 277
Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). This case will be discussed in this article only as it relates to the riparian
right to salinity control. For a complete discussion of this case, see Robie, The Delta Decision-
The Quiet Revolution in California Water Rights, 19 Pac. L. J. 1111 (1988).
7. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 107,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (1986).
1144
1988 / Salinity Control
protection from salinity. Relatively low levels of salinity are critical
to the enjoyment of the Delta riparian right which is exercised
predominately for irrigation of agricultural crops.
THE RiPARIAN RIGHT
The riparian right in California water law has many characteristics
which significantly affect water use in the State. A riparian right is
generally superior to appropriative water rights,8 is dependent upon
ownership of land contiguous to a body of water, is correlative and
is limited to use on certain contiguous riparian land and to use for
certain purposes, including domestic, industrial, agricultural and power
purposes. A riparian right is not lost by nonuse.
The riparian right is limited to the use of the natural flow of the
watercourse, that is, water which flows in the state of nature with
at most, only temporary regulatory storage. A riparian right holder
has no right to divert water which was imported to the stream from
another stream or watershed or which was in long-term or seasonal
storage.9 The riparian right entitles the water right holder to have
the stream of water flow to the riparian land.'0 Most importantly
for this discussion, the riparian right entitles the water right holder
to a degree of water quality protection.
The degree of water quality protection depends on the circum-
stances of each case, but the law of riparian water rights clearly
protects downstream riparians from upstream pollution which impairs
the riparian's use. 1 This does not mean, however, that the riparian
right holder is entitled to enjoin all upstream uses to protect the
riparians' right to water quality. Such a principle would seriously
limit water development and use in this State. The downstream
riparian right does not preclude upstream riparian and appropriative
8. See W. HtrrcmNs, THE CALiFoRNA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 62-63 (1956). See In re
Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr.
350 (1979) (a statutory adjudication determining that unused riparian rights may be relegated
to a lower priority than exercised appropriative rights).
9. Chowchilla Farms v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 19, 25 P.2d 435, 442 (1933); Herminghaus
v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 111, 252 P. 609, 619 (1926); Seneca Consol. Gold
Mines Co. v. Great W. Power Co., 209 Cal. 206, 216-17, 287 P. 93, 97 (1930).
10. Fall River Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 202 Cal. 56, 65, 259
P. 444, 448 (1927).
11. Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 525, 89 P. 338, 340
(1907); Mentone Irrigation Co. v. Redlands Elec. Light & Power Co., 155 Cal. 323, 327, 100
P. 1082, 1083 (1909).
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uses which are reasonable 12 and do not unnecessarily or maliciously
injure the downstream riparian right. 3
The protection of downstream Delta water rights, primarily riparian
rights, continues to be a major issue. The State Water Resources
Control Board's most recent attempt to protect Delta water rights
was in 1978 when it issued a Water Quality Control Plan for the
Delta 14 and Water Right Decision 1485.15 The legal challenges to the
Plan and Decision resulted in the landmark case, United States v.
State Water Resources Control Board.'6 The court in this case side-
stepped the issue of the nature and extent of the riparian right to
12. The 1928 constitutional amendment, which is now article X, section 2 of the California
Constitution, was enacted in response to a series of decisions culminating in a California
Supreme Court decision, Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252
P. 607 (1926), which upheld the riparian right as against an appropriative right notwithstanding
the unreasonableness and wastefulness of the riparian use. Article X, section 2 states:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the
general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial
use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is
to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest
of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow
of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be
limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be
served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable
use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much
of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for
the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such
reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water
of the stream to which the owner's land is riparian under reasonable methods of
diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of water to which the appro-
priator is lawfully entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature
may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.
CAL. CoNsT. art. X, § 2.
13. Holmes v. Nay, 186 Cal. 231, 241, 199 P. 325, 330 (1921).
14. STATE WATER REsOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QuALirY CONTROL PLAN, SACRA-
MENTo-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA AND SUIsUN MARSH (August 1978). The Plan designated Delta
beneficial uses to be protected, established water quality standards for the reasonable protection
of the beneficial uses, and established a program of implementation. Id.
15. State Water Resources Control Board [hereinafter S.W.R.C.B.], Decision 1485 (August
1978) (Sacramento-San Joaguin Delta and Suisun Marsh). The Water Right Decision imposed
conditions on the water right permits of the United States for the Central Valley Project and
on the water right permits of the State for the State Water Project. Id. The purpose of these
conditions was, in part, to protect Delta water rights from adverse effects from the projects;
i.e., to ensure that the projects, as junior appropriators, do not impair the Delta rights. Id.
This was done by defining the Delta water quality right vis-a-vis the projects in terms of
salinity levels and requiring that the projects be operated to meet certain salinity levels in
various parts of the Delta. Id. Project operations for meeting salinity levels include making
releases from upstream storage reservoirs and reducing or refraining from making diversions
from the Southern Delta through the State and Federal pumping plants. Id.
16. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
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salinity control asserting simply that "existing constitutional and
legislative authorities encompass the Board's obligation to protect
the quality of the Delta waters from salt water intrusion. ' 1i7 In short,
the court held that the Board has a significant amount of discretion
in determining proper levels of protection and in assigning respon-
sibility to meet its requirements. The issue of the scope of the riparian
right, however, remains. This issue is relevant to the Board as it
attempts to satisfy its obligation to reasonably protect Delta water
quality as part of the Bay-Delta Hearing and as part of its dry-year
programs.
To the extent that Delta riparian rights encompass the right to
salinity control, a certain amount of the natural flow cannot be used
upstream and must be allowed to reach the Delta riparians. In other
words, satisfaction of the riparian salinity control right is the obli-
gation of upstream and Delta water right holders with equal or junior
rights to the natural flow.
Those with equal rights are other riparians on the stream system.
These riparians have a correlative or shared obligation to help meet
17. In its original opinion, dated May 28, 1986, the court specifically considered the issue
of the riparian right to salinity control and, based on its interpretation of Antioch v. Williams
Irrigation District, 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922), concluded that "common law water rights
of riparians and appropriators do not include salinity control through curtailment of upstream
diversions in order to leave enough water in the stream to resist saltwater intrusion." United
States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., at 37 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
In its Order Modifying Opinion and Denying Rehearing, dated June 25, 1986, the court
omitted the foregoing conclusion regarding the riparian right to salinity control. After discussing
Antioch, the court draws no conclusion from it, stating simply that, "Whatever final conclusion
is to be drawn from Antioch regarding the nature and extent of common law riparian rights
to salinity control, existing constitutional and legislative authorities encompass the Board's
obligation to protect the quality of the Delta waters from saltwater intrusion." United States
v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
Similarly, in the May 28, 1986 opinion, the court stated that "[W]hile common law affords
water rights holders relief from pollution, such protection does not include rights to limit
upstream use in order to permit sufficient flow for salinity control." United States v. State
Water Resources Control Bd., at 36 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The published
opinion omits this conclusion and states instead, "But while common law clearly affords water
rights holders relief from pollution, it is debatable whether such protection included the right
to require upstream subsequent appropriators to curtail their use of water solely to permit a
sufficient flow to resist natural saltwater intrusion." United States v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 178. Clearly, the court intended to
leave this issue unresolved.
In an apparent mistake in drafting the Order Modifying Opinion and Denying Rehearing,
the court failed to omit a later reference back to the now-omitted conclusion regarding the
riparian right to salinity control. In the discussion of riparian industrial rights, the opinion
states, "As we have previously discussed, the common law riparian rights of the paper
companies do not include salinity control." Id. at 144, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 197. Leaving this
reference in the opinion, we believe, was an oversight. See infra text at notes 59-80 (discussion
of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1972)).
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downstream riparian rights. 8 Appropriators on the stream system,
which include the Projects, generally have priorities which are junior
to Delta riparians. Appropriative priorities vis-a-vis other appropri-
ators are based on the dates of the applications to appropriate water. 19
The Projects are subject to further statutory limitations protecting
the Delta20 and watershed of origin 2' but these statutes do not affect
the issue of the riparian right to salinity control. In addition, the
Projects are responsible for mitigating their environmental effects. 22
With this understanding of the general nature of the riparian right,
junior rights and the latest judicial direction regarding the responsi-
bility to protect Delta water quality, we turn first to a discussion of
the legal basis for the riparian right to water quality protection. We
will then discuss specifically the riparian right to salinity control.
T-E RIPARIAN RIGHT TO WATER QUALITY PROTECTION
One of the earliest American cases cited as upholding the common
law riparian right to water quality protection is Merrifield v. Lom-
bard.2 1 In this 1866 Massachusetts case, a downstream riparian land-
holder complained that an upstream proprietor was polluting the
18. See Pabst v. Finmand, 190 Cal. 124, 129, 211 P. 11, 13 (1922).
19. CAL. WATER CODE § 1450 (West 1971).
20. The Delta Protection Act establishes certain parameters for use of water in the Delta.
See id. §§ 12200-12259 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988). Pursuant to section 12201, delivery of water
under the Delta Protection Act is made subject to the County of Origin and Watershed of
Origin statutes. See id. §§ 10505 (regarding County of Origin), 11460-11463 (regarding Water-
shed of Origin). California Water Code section 12202 states in part:
Among the functions to be provided by the State Water Resources Development
System, in coordination with the activities of the United States in providing control
for the Delta through operation of the Federal Central Valley Project, shall be the
provision of salinity control and an adequate water supply for the users of water in
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta....
Id. § 12202 (West 1971). California Water Code section 12203 states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that no person, corporation or
public or private agency or the State or the United States should divert water from
the channels of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to which the users within said
Delta are entitled.
Id. § 12203 (West 1971). California Water Code section 12204 ties the previous two sections
together by specifying that no water may be exported which is necessary to meet the requirements
of sections 12202 and 12203.
21. Id. § 11460-11465 (West 1971) (prohibiting the Projects from diverting water which
is reasonably required to adequately supply the beneficial needs of the watershed of origin or
adjacent area).
22. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21193. (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
23. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 16 (1866).
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stream with corrosive substances, fouling plaintiff's mill machinery.
The court ruled that:
Any diversion or obstruction of the water which substantially di-
minishes the volume of the stream so that it does not flow 'ut
currere solebut' [as it is wont to run], or which causes material
impairment of quality or prevents its use in irrigation, machinery
propulsion, or domestic consumption is an infringement of the right
of other riparian owners.24
In 1886, the case of Lux v. Haggin25 established the common law
riparian doctrine as a fundamental water rights law of California,
along with the prior appropriation doctrine. Riparians have a right
to have natural streams flow to the riparian land, subject to reason-
able impairment in quantity and quality by other users (the correlative
rights doctrine).2
Following the Lux v. Haggin decision, early California cases adopted
the common law riparian right respecting natural water quality pro-
tection.2 7 In a representative case, Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co.,2 the plaintiff was a riparian who diverted water for irrigation
and domestic purposes. He brought an action against the defendant
utility company to quiet title to land and water rights and for damages
caused by interference with his rights. The defendant was an upstream
riparian using the water for hydroelectric power generation. The
plaintiff complained that the defendant's construction and operation
24. Merrifield v. Lombard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 16 (1866).
25. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
26. W. HuTrcmNs, supra note 8, at 183-85.
27. See People v. Elk River Mill and Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 214, 40 P. 486 (1895);
Peterson v. Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 51 P. 557 (1897); Holmes v. Nay, 186 Cal. 231, 199
P. 325 (1921). Appropriators, as well as riparians, have a right to have the natural quality of
water protected against polluting uses by upstream users with inferior rights. The right was
established in a series of older cases. W. Hutchins, supra note 8, at 123. This right was upheld
in a case where a downstream appropriator sought to enjoin and recover damages from a
subsequent upstream appropriator. See Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942).
The plaintiff in Wright complained that the upstream user polluted the stream with mine
tailings which rendered the water unfit for plaintiff's domestic and agricultural uses. The court
applied the standard of material impairment to determine the extent of plaintiff's right to
water quality. The court said:
lilt is an established rule in this State that an appropriator of waters of a stream,
as against upper owners with inferior rights of user, is entitled to have the water at
his point of diversion preserved in its natural state of purity, and any use which
corrupts the water so as to essentially impair its usefulness for the purposes to which
he originally devoted it, is an invasion of his rights. Any material deterioration of
the quality of the stream by subsequent appropriators or others without superior
rights entitles him to both injunctive and legal relief."
Id. at 378, 121 P.2d at 709.
28. 207 Cal. 8, 276 P. 1017 (1929).
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of the dam and power plant polluted the river by introducing debris
into it and by causing the stream to become stagnant, with the effect
that the water of the stream was unfit for his beneficial uses.
Although the court acknowledged that the defendant's generation of
power was a proper riparian use, it affirmed the plaintiff's right to
water quality protection, noting:
The Law is well settled that any use of a stream which materially
fouls and adulterates the water, or the deposit or discharge therein
of any filthy or noxious substances that so far affect the water as
to impair its value for the ordinary purposes of life, or anything
that renders the water less wholesome than when in its ordinary
state will constitute a nuisance, which courts of equity will enjoin,
and for which a lower riparian owner, injured thereby, is entitled
to redress. 29
The subsequent adoption of the constitutional amendment in 1928
was a landmark in the development of California water rights law.30
The amendment applies to all classes of water rights, including
established riparian rights.31 It restricts the enforcement of riparian
rights vis-a-vis a junior claimant where such enforcement would
protect an unreasonable use or lead to the waste of water, a resource
vital to the economic development of the State. However, the general
riparian right to water quality continues to be protected in California
law, subsequent to the 1928 amendment, as long as the riparian use
is beneficial and the desire for water quality protection is not unrea-
sonable in the context of the constitutional policy regarding waste. 32
Tim RIPARIAN RIGHT TO WATER QUALITY
PROTECTION FROM UPSTREAM DIVERSIONS
Seawater incursion is included in a class of water quality problems
which courts do not regularly confront. The more common type of
water quality dispute involves a direct discharge by the upstream
proprietor of waste, such as sewage, mine tailings, or pesticides. This
discharge impairs the natural water quality to the detriment of the
downstream user. The common law rules regarding water quality
rights were developed around this type of direct pollution. 33
29. Joeger, 207 Cal. at 25, 276 P. at 1025.
30. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1976).
31. Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 700, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
32. See Meridian, Ltd. v. San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P.2d 537 (1939); Deetz v.
Carter, 232 Cal. App. 2d 851, 43 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1965).
33. Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922).
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However, the application of the general rules in water quality cases
has not been limited to direct discharges by upstream proprietors. 4
In his definition of the riparian right, one author observed:
Riparians have a natural right to have natural streams flow unim-
paired in quality as well as quantity and any use of a stream by
one proprietor which defiles it to such a degree as essentially to
impair its purity and usefulness for any purposes to which running
water is usually applied is an invasion of a private -ight for which
those injured thereby are entitled to a remedy. 5
In the case of seawater incursion in the Delta, the problem is not
attributable to the upstream users' discharge of waste. No claim is
being made that upstream users are placing something in the water
that affects natural purity. The real cause of seawater incursion is
the decrease in the natural flow of the river brought about by the
upstream users' diversion of water. The decrease in flow has the
effect of reducing the hydraulic force of the river. This force of flow
acts as a barrier to the incursion of seawater at the western end of
the Delta. With the reduction in countervailing fresh water forces,
marine tidal action pushes the seawater farther up into the Delta.
The waters become more saline and, if the incursion is substantial,
unfit for domestic, agricultural and industrial uses.
California cases have specifically concluded that the riparian right
extends to protection against water quality impairment caused by
upstream diversions. In Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp.36 and
connected cases, McArthur v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp.37 and Albaugh
v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. ,38 the defendant utility company dammed
up a river upon which plaintiffs were riparian water users. The
defendant's use was also riparian. During the summer months, the
defendant's diversion of the natural flow for power generation pur-
poses caused the stagnation of the pool around which the plaintiffs
lived and from which they drew water. Greater flow from the
dammed river was needed to freshen the pool. The plaintiffs sued
for damages on the basis of this injury to their right. The court
sustained this claim by holding the injury actionable under the general
riparian right recognized in California:
34. See J. GOULD, LAW OF WATERS (3d ed. 1900); C. KINNEY, ON IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTS 2043 (1912); 5 R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 716 (1977).
35. J. GOULD, supra note 34, at 430 (emphasis added).
36. 220 Cal. 295, 30 P.2d 30 (1934).
37. 3 Cal. 2d 704, 45 P.2d 807 (1935).
38. 9 Cal. 2d 751, 73 P.2d 217 (1937).
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Under the California authorities and under the law of these cases
as enunciated in former appeals, a riparian owner, even as against
another riparian, is entitled not only to an undiminished flow of
water, except as reduced by the reasonable use of other riparians
and prior appropriators, but also to a substantially unpolluted
stream. The riparian owner is entitled not only to the same quantity
of water, but also to the same quality of water, provided by nature
in the stream.39
The plaintiffs were entitled to relief after proving that the defendant's
diversion (i.e., construction of the dam) caused the material impair-
ment of the quality of water in the pool.
In Meridian, Ltd. v. San Francisco,40 a riparian landowner on the
Tuolumne River sought a decree from the court ordering the defen-
dant, an upstream appropriator with lower priority rights, to limit
its diversions of water. The defendant municipality built a dam on
the Tuolumne River for water storage. The water was used for power
generation purposes. It was also diverted through a major aqueduct
to supply the needs of the city's residents and industries. Many users
of water for agricultural purposes were diverting water between the
defendant's dam and the plaintiff's point of diversion. The return
flows from these intermediary users contained much salt, alkalies,
and other chemical substances, which would render the water unfit
for irrigation if sufficiently concentrated. The plaintiff claimed sub-
stantial injury on the basis that the diminution of flow caused by
the defendant's diversion led to an increase in the normal mineral
concentration of the water. The California Supreme Court, finding
that substantial injury was not demonstrated by the evidence, reversed
the trial court's issuance of an injunction. However, the court stated
that, with sufficient evidence, the plaintiff would be entitled to relief
under its superior riparian right. 4' The ruling that the general ripar-
ian's right to water quality is applicable to this type of pollution is
consistent with the court's earlier treatment of the Crum case.
The court in Meridian also discussed the relationship of the water
quality element of the riparian right to the constitutional standard
requiring reasonable use. The court stated:
Under the amendment of 1928 the right of the riparian attaches to,
but to no more than so much of the flow as may be required or
used consistently with the amendment. That is, the riparian is
39. Crum, 220 Cal. at 312, 30 P.2d at 38.
40. 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P.2d 537 (1939).
41. Meridian, 13 Cal. 2d at 447, 451, 90 P.2d at 548, 550.
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entitled to all of the water of the stream, both in the quantity and
quality of its natural state, which he is able to put to a reasonable,
beneficial use, and to be protected in that right by the injunctive
processes of the court.42
A more recent case, Deetz v. Carter,43 followed its predecessors in
upholding the riparian right where water quality was impaired due
to excessive upstream diversion. The dispute involved two riparian
landowners on a small stream. Since the plaintiff, who was the
downstream user, depended on the water for his domestic supply,
his needs were accorded a statutory preference. 44 The diminution in
flow in the stream caused by the defendant's diversion of the water
for agricultural purposes made the quality of the remaining water
unfit for the plaintiff's domestic uses. The plaintiff claimed rights in
the entire flow of the stream to maintain its fitness even though only
a portion of the flow was actually being consumed for his domestic
purposes. The plaintiff used the remainder for irrigation, a non-
domestic purpose. The court held that the plaintiff's demand for the
full flow of the stream was reasonable in light of the statutory
preference given to domestic uses. In the court's view, the right
should extend to that flow necessary to make the preferred right
effective.
Courts in jurisdictions other than California have also upheld the
riparian right to protection of water quality from upstream diversions.
A New Jersey case, Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Watson,45 involved
a dispute between an upstream water utility company and a down-
stream riparian diverter who operated a bleachery. The utility com-
pany had proposed to increase the height of its upstream dam. The
plaintiff bleachery operator complained that modification to the dam
would so diminish the flow of the river as to degrade the natural
clarity of the water. This degradation would make the water unfit
for plaintiff's use in the bleachery. The court gave protection to the
downstream riparian by requiring the defendant to forego the mod-
ification of the height of its dam so as not to cause any further
diminution or interruption of the stream flow. Likewise in a New
York case, the erection of a dam so diminished the flow of a river
that decomposed matter became exposed to the air. This activity
42. Id. at 447, 90 P.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
43. 232 Cal. App. 2d 851, 43 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1965).
44. See CAL. WATER CODE § 106 (West 1971).
45. 29 N.J. Eq. 366 (1878).
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created an actionable public nuisance because of its detrimental effect
on health.46
An early Texas case resolved a similar pollution problem in favor
of the downstream riparian. In Biggs v. Lee,47 an upstream user's
diversions so decreased the flow of the stream that the mineral
content of the remaining water became excessive, making it unfit for
the complaining riparian's domestic and agricultural uses. Although
the defendant upstream user was a riparian landowner, his water
diversions were for use on non-riparian lands. Therefore, his rights
were inferior to, not correlative with, the riparian rights of the
plaintiff. This case is similar to one where a riparian sues an
appropriator with inferior rights. In the context of this relationship
between the parties, the court ruled: "The riparian owner ... is
entitled to sufficient water for his land's purposes. This necessarily
means sufficient usable water, and it would be proper for a decree,
if he shows himself entitled to one, to award sufficient water so as
to avoid mineral impregnation .... ,,48
These cases support the established rule that when the upstream
users' diversions so diminish the flow as to cause a material impair-
ment of the water quality, downstream riparian landholders who use
water for reasonable, beneficial purposes are entitled to relief against
upstream users, especially against those whose water rights are sub-
sequent in time or inferior in priority. In addition, quality impairment
by diminution in flow has been treated the same as the more usual
type of water quality impairment, the direct discharge of waste. The
riparian right holder thus is entitled to enjoy the natural flow of the
stream to the extent of reasonable use and to protection from water
quality impairment by both direct discharges and diminution in flow.
THE RiPARIA4N RIGHT TO SALINITY CONTROL
Although courts have not had much occasion to deal specifically
with seawater incursion problems, it seems that the general rules
governing the more common water quality disputes still apply. Ju-
risdictions other than California have dealt with the seawater incur-
sion problem. In these jurisdictions, the injured water users have
been protected from seawater incursion caused by the actions of
others.
46. People v. Pelton, 55 N.Y.S. 815, 36 A.D. 450 (1899).
47. 147 S.W. 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912, error dismissed).
48. Id.
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Two cases, both from Texas, involved plaintiffs who had riparian
rights to the affected stream. In the first case, Bigham Bros. v. Port
Arthur Canal and Dock Co.,49 the plaintiff was a rice farmer who
used the waters of the stream for domestic and agricultural purposes.
The plaintiff sought damages for impairment of the natural water
quality against the defendant, a canal company working under stat-
utory authority of the state to improve navigable waters. The defen-
dant, by building a canal over dry land between a river which flowed
into the sea and the stream upon which the plaintiff was a riparian
owner, precipitated the incursion of seawater up to and beyond the
plaintiff's point of diversion. The water became unfit for the plain-
tiff's uses. The question faced by the court was whether seawater
incursion is a type of water pollution protected under the general
riparian right to water quality. The court held that it was, and
awarded relief to the injured owner. The court reasoned that the
origin of the salt, whether a polluting source from above or the sea
below, was irrelevant; relief would have been granted in the former
case, so it would also be granted in the latter.5 0
The second case is Houston Transportation Co. v. San Jacinto
Rice Co.." The plaintiff, a rice farmer, held riparian rights to divert
water near the mouth of the river for domestic and agricultural
purposes. The defendant was a dredging business who dredged the
mouth of the river for sand to be used in making concrete. The
plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from removing a large sand
bar at the mouth of the river which provided an effective, natural
barrier to the influx of seawater. Without such a barrier, seawater
would have flowed well beyond the plaintiff's diversion point, es-
pecially during the seasonal flood tides. The court granted the in-
junction on the basis of the plaintiff's riparian right to water quality.
This right was upheld despite the significant public interest involved
in insuring a supply of sand and concrete necessary for the devel-
opment of the nearby city of Houston.
From these two cases, it is clear that the State of Texas includes
the element of salinity control in the common law riparian right to
water quality. The plaintiffs in the Texas cases were not asking that
upstream users forego their diversions in order to maintain the
necessary outflow and quality at the mouth of the river. However,
49. 100 Tex. 192, 97 S.W. 686 (1906).
50. Bigham, 100 Tex. at 202, 97 S.W. at 689.
51. 163 S.W. 1023 (rex. Ct. App. 1914).
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recognition of the plaintiffs' claims was attacked on other important
public policy grounds. These attacks failed to sway the opinion of
the two courts.
There are other cases involving injuries to property rights caused
by seawater incursion that, although not directly addressing the
question of whether salinity control attaches to riparian rights, de-
serve mention for the sake of completeness. First, in the long,
complex case of United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility District,12
the United States sought to establish rights to the full flow of a
stream as against an upstream appropriator. The United States was
the owner of a tract of land located near the ocean and overlying a
large groundwater basin fed by the waters of an adjoining stream.
The government asserted that it needed the entire flow of the stream
in order to recharge the underground basin. The recharge created a
fresh water barrier which prevented seawater intrusion. The case
dragged on for more than ten years, but the issue of salinity control
rights was never specifically decided in the published opinions. 3
A serious drought brought on the dispute in New Jersey v. New
York.54 The State of New York planned to divert headwaters of the
Delaware River out of the watershed for the municipal uses of New
York City. The full diversion would have led to significant seawater
incursion at the mouth of the river, resulting in great harm to New
Jersey's commercial oyster fisheries and other water users. The court
did not interpret the rights of the two parties according to strict
riparian law because it viewed the dispute as one between two
sovereigns. In an attempt to reconcile the substantial interests of
both states, the court issued a decree limiting the amount of water
to be diverted by New York and specifying a minimum rate of flow
at certain downstream points to protect those users near the mouth
of the river.
The earliest American case involving seawater pollution arose in
Massachusetts. In Mears v. Dole,-5 the defendant owned land bor-
dering on the ocean. In the process of excavating for gravel, the
defendant dug a long ditch which was open to the ocean. Due to
tidal action, the seawater came up the ditch causing injury to the
52. 101 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
53. See Fallbrook, 108 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1952), 109 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958), 193 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Cal. 1961). See also California v.
United States, 235 F.2d 647, 663 (9th Cir. 1956) (a connected case).
54. 283 U.S. 336 (1931), modified, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
55. 135 Mass. 508 (1883).
1156
1988 / Salinity Control
plaintiff's nearby property. The seawater percolated into and polluted
the groundwater underlying the plaintiff's land. In addition, the
seawater overflowed and eroded part of the plaintiff's land. In
deciding that the defendant's action constituted a nuisance, the court
ruled that: "A person who excavates on his land in such a manner
as to let in the sea, which undermines and injures adjoining land of
another, is liable to an action by the latter for the injuries so caused,
including injury done to a well by the percolation of saltwater.'' 56
The court said that the effect of the defendant's activity was signif-
icant, not the nature of the activity: "It is true that the injury was
caused by the natural action of the sea; but this action was exerted
at a place where it would not have occurred except for the acts of
the defendant." 57 The court also stated, "It is well settled to be an
actionable tort to allow filthy water to percolate from a vault through
the soil to the injury of a well of a neighbor. Though seawater may
not be filthy, it is as effectually destructive as is such water.
' 5 8
On its facts, Mears v. Dole is not significantly different from the
previously discussed Texas cases. At issue was the defendant's liability
for removing a natural barrier to seawater pollution. As in the Texas
cases, this one hundred five-year-old common law case held that the
defendant was liable for his invasion of the property right.
Numerous cases from California and other jurisdictions have rec-
ognized the riparian right to water quality protection from upstream
diversion, and there is authority from other jurisdictions recognizing
the riparian right to salinity control. The one California case that
directly addresses the question of the right to salinity control includes
language which can be interpreted as reaching a conclusion contrary
to all of the authorities previously discussed. But this case, Antioch
v. Williams Irr. Dist. ,9 is not determinative of the issue of riparian
rights to salinity control.60 Rather than a ruling on the right to
salinity control 61 Antioch is more accurately characterized as
56. Mears, 135 Mass. at 510.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922).
60. See Wiel, The Pending Water Amendment, 16 CALIn. L. Rnv. 169 (1928); but see
Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the California Law of Riparian Rights, 17 CALIF. L.
REv. 251 (1928). See also United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Ca.
App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986); supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussion of
Antioch).
61. In the past half century since the decision was rendered, conditions have changed to
such an extent that even its precedentia value with respect to appropriative rights is limited.
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a reasonable use case. Like the 1928 amendment to the California
Constitution some years following Antioch,62 the Supreme Court's
decision in effect prohibited a waste of water.63  The dispute in the
Antioch case arose out of drought conditions faced by Northern
California in the early 1920s. The plaintiff, Antioch, a municipality
located near the mouth of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, di-
verted water from the Delta under an appropriative right. This right
entitled Antioch to a quantity of water equal to a continuous flow
of about one cubic foot per second (cfs). Under normal climatic
conditions, Antioch had no problem with saltwater incursion at its
point of intake and, therefore, did not suffer injury due to the
diversions of upstream users. However, conditions changed during
the drought. The flow of water into the Delta was reduced to such
an extent that the tides pushed highly saline water up into the mouth
of the Delta past Antioch's intake point. The salinity content of the
water became so high as to make it unfit for domestic uses. To
assure a salinity barrier that would effectively protect Antioch's
interests a minimum flow of 3,500 cfs would have to enter the Delta
from the Sacramento River. Such a flow would have been maintained
in the stream, even during the extreme dry season, but for the large
diversions by the defendants on the river above the City of Sacra-
mento. Therefore, since these defendant farmers held lower priority
appropriative rights, Antioch brought suit to enjoin their uses of
water.
The California Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the impair-
ment of water quality due to salinity incursion as an actionable
injury. 64 The court noted that the holding was an exception to the
general rule that an appropriator for beneficial uses "has the right
to enjoin the pollution of the stream above him, so that the water
may flow down to his place of diversion in a condition as suitable
for these uses as it was at the time he acquired his right to take
it. ''6
See S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1379, 13-14 (1971) ("The Delta Water Rights Decision"); S.W.R.C.B.
Decision 1485, 16-17 (1978) (Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh); United States
v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
62. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
63. Nonetheless, prior to the 1928 amendment, under the appropriative rights doctrine,
appropriators were subject to the requirement of reasonable use and the prohibition of waste.
See Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117, 137, 128 P. 21, 29 (1912).
64. Antioch, 188 Cal. at 467, 205 P. at 695.
65. Id. at 459, 205 P. at 692.
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The primary reason for carving out this exception was to prevent
what the court considered a waste of a resource that was vital to
California's agricultural development. To uphold the plaintiff's right
to a flow of 1 cfs would mean that over 3,000 cfs of water otherwise
available for upstream agricultural purposes would flow into the sea
without any beneficial use. This great disparity led the court to
conclude "it would be hard to conceive of a greater waste for so
small a benefit." 66 Of critical importance in analyzing the Antioch
decision, however, is the fact that it preceded the 1928 constitutional
amendment prohibiting waste. 67
Associated with the problem of waste was the court's concern that
a recognition of a prior appropriator's right to salinity control would
hinder further upstream development. Future diverters of water above
the Delta, both private and public, could not safely invest in im-
provements and diversion facilities without coming to terms with
those appropriators near the mouth of the Delta who might be
adversely affected. Private agreements and public condemnation would
be problematic and costly because of the difficulties involved in
ascertaining all necessary parties in a settlement and determining the
extent of injuries to and value of the prior appropriator's right. In
addition, in the case of an actual violation of the right, the senior
appropriator's claim against any particular upstream diverter for
damages would be difficult to prove. In practice, the downstream
right holder would be forced to give up a claim for damages, or the
upstream appropriation would have to be enjoined. 61
The court in Antioch further distinguished this case from those
which had applied the general rule by noting the novelty of the
pollution involved and the implicit flexibility of the appropriation
doctrine to adapt to the peculiar conditions existing in the State.69
The court was also perturbed that the town of Antioch would pursue
its claim in the courts when the litigation could have been avoided
by merely "moving its pumps a few miles up river" where it could
have obtained good quality water.70
66. Id. at 461, 205 P. at 693.
67. But see supra notes 30-32, 62 and accompanying text.
68. Antioch, 188 Cal. at 465, 205 P. at 694-95.
69. Id. at 461, 463, 205 P. at 693, 694.
70. Id. at 465, 205 P. at 694. The court here may have presaged the line of cases which
held that even riparian owners may be required to endure some inconvenience or to incur
reasonable expenses in implementing physical solutions to prevent waste or unreasonable use.
See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938); People ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976).
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For all of the above reasons, Antioch was decided correctly. The
court avoided a sizeable waste of water and allowed for future
development of California's water supplies. In modern parlance,
although the court recognized Antioch's appropriative right, it in-
cluded in its analysis the reasonable use requirement. Under the
circumstances, it would have been unreasonable to provide the water
quality, in terms of salinity control, which Antioch claimed it de-
served. The court's discussion of the right to salinity control, how-
ever, was not needed and has resulted in significant confusion.
The Antioch court's discussion of salinity control focused on the
potential unreasonable use associated with the flows needed to pro-
vide the salinity control. In the sixty years since Antioch, circum-
stances have changed significantly. Unreasonable use is now
constitutionally prohibited1.7 And most notably, water quality stan-
dards for protection of Delta rights are adopted administratively by
the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board). Some of
these standards encompass limits on salinity at various points in the
Delta.72 The federal and state projects currently meet these stan-
dards.73 If the salinity level standards adopted by the State Board
are reasonable and otherwise legal, 74 then the potential waste and
obstacles to development that concerned the Antioch court cannot
exist. At present, the State Board makes the all-important determi-
nation of reasonableness. The State Board, in its standard setting
process, determines the appropriate level of protection, in terms of
salinity control, of Delta riparian water quality.
This administrative procedure did not exist at the time Antioch
was decided. Had it existed, the Antioch court may not have viewed
the right to salinity control with such alarm. In view of the admin-
istrative procedure, a modern court should not rely on Antioch's
discussion of salinity control.7 5
The Antioch court's specific discussion of the right to salinity
control is flawed. The court tried to distinguish the two Texas
71. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
72. Water quality standards may also set flow limits. See S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1485,
(August 1978) Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh. See also supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
73. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
74. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1360 (West 1971) (State Water Resources Control Board
water right decisions may be reviewed by writ of mandate).
75. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 116-
18, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 178-79 (1986).
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decisions which recognized the riparian right to salinity control.7 6 The
basis of the distinction, however, is not clear from the opinion. 77
The major basis of the distinction seemed to be that the Texas courts
failed to consider the important policy of water conservation that is
involved in the establishment of a right to salinity control. This
distinction is not convincing. Also, the court in Antioch indicated
that the seawater incursion problem faced by the Texas courts was
a more direct interference with property fights, and therefore more
aptly resolved by the general property right rules. However, it is
difficult to distinguish among different causes of seawater incursion.
In the Texas cases, neither defendant discharged anything into the
river. However, the effect of their activity was the removal of a
natural barrier to seawater incursion. In the same manner, the
defendants in the Antioch case were not discharging any waste into
the river. Their diversions did cause the removal of another type of
salinity barrier, one formed by the hydraulic force of the river.
The fact that Antioch was a dispute between appropriators is of
some consequence. Riparian rights were not involved. The Antioch
court may have viewed an assertion of a riparian right to salinity
control more favorably. The Antioch court suggested that its ruling
on the extent of appropriative rights should be construed narrowly:
"The rule we may adopt here can scarcely be a precedent for any
case except one arising upon these two rivers concerning a similar
claim of some prior appropriator near the outlets thereof. '78
In addition, the court at another point specifically stated that the
issue of riparian use was not being addressed. 79 However, it should
not matter whether the water user at the western edge of the Delta
is claiming superior rights on the basis of the riparian or the appro-
priation doctrine. The establishment of a riparian right to salinity
control would give rise to the same problems of waste and deterrence
to economic development that the court sought to avoid in its
limitation of the appropriative right.
In fact, a case decided by the California Supreme Court only four
years after Antioch suggests that the riparian right would be given
greater protection in the face of contrary public interests. In Her-
76. Antioch, 188 Cal. at 465-67, 205 P. at 695. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying
text.
77. Antioch, 188 Cal. at 465-67, 205 P. at 695.
78. Id. at 464, 205 P. at 694.
79. Id. at 456, 205 P. at 691.
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minghaus v. So. Calif. Edison Co.,1° the plaintiff was a downstream
riparian who sought to enjoin the upstream appropriator's use of
the water. The defendant had dammed up the flow of the river so
as to provide a suitable head for power generation. Because of
damming, the full natural flow of the river would not reach the
plaintiff's lands during the period of greatest runoff. This greatly
diminished the value of plaintiff's agricultural lands because he
depended upon this periodic, full flow to inundate his lands and
produce a silting, fertilizing and irrigating effect. On the basis of the
common law rule that "a riparian owner is entitled to restrain any
diversion by a junior appropriator which will deprive him of the
customary flow of water which is or may be beneficial to his land",
the court granted the injunction despite the great waste involved in
protecting the right.81 In reflecting upon the policy arguments, the
court said, "public policy is at best a vague and uncertain guide,
and no consideration of policy can justify the taking of private
property without compensation. ' 8 2
The constitutional amendment of 192881 was passed in reaction to
the Herminghaus case. As previously explained, the amendment
requires the courts to evaluate all water rights claims in the context
of the specified policies of reasonableness and waste prevention.8 4
The riparian right, which previously entitled the riparian owner to
all waters of a stream without regard to the reasonableness of his
use against an appropriator, is now limited by the amendment to
reasonable, beneficial use as against appropriators and riparians
alike. 85
It would seem that the amendment could have removed the element
of salinity control from the riparian right (assuming that such element
existed previously) where the protection of such right would require
a great waste of water into the sea. However, cases decided after
1928, surprisingly, have reached a different conclusion. In a factual
situation very similar to that in Herminghaus, the United States
Supreme Court held that the riparian's right to the full natural flow
as against a subsequent appropriator survived the California consti-
80. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926).
81. Herminghaus, 200 Cal. at 100-01, 252 P. at 615.
82. Id. at 101, 252 P. at 615.
83. Cal. Const. art. X, § 2 (1928, amended 1976).
84. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
85. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1967); Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
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tutional amendment.8 6 The Court refused to grant protection in the
form of an injunction against the defendant United States because
the effect of an injunction would have been to cause great amounts
of water to be lost to the sea. The Court said that this relief would
be contrary to the constitutional policy. In spite of the fact that
enforcement of the right by way of an injunction would have resulted
in a waste or unreasonable use of water, the Court found that the
riparian's use of overflow water was reasonable. The remedy for the
violation of the riparian's right was limited to compensation for the
taking of the right. The California Supreme Court later noted this
result without disapproval in Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water Dis-
trict.87
In other dicta, the California Supreme Court has indicated that
the large waste involved in protecting an otherwise reasonable water
use does not destroy the right, but rather limits the remedy for the
invasion of the right. City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility
District8 involved the right of a prior appropriator to sufficient flow
of a river to recharge an underground water basin. Similarly, Merid-
ian, Ltd. v. San Francisco89 involved the right of a riparian to
sufficient flow to protect water quality. These cases provide post-
1928 precedent for protection of an established water right, especially
riparian rights, in factual situations similar to that presented in the
Antioch case.
The result reached in Antioch is totally consistent with current
law. Antioch provides little if any support contrary to the great
weight of authority that recognizes the riparian right to salinity
control under appropriate circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The right to salinity control is a crucial element of the riparian
right. It is part of the right to water quality protection. This right
extends to protection from traditional sources of pollution by dis-
charges into a body of water and from less typical water quality
degradation due to upstream diversions.
Inclusion of the element of salinity control within the general
riparian right to water quality is consistent with case precedent in
86. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
87. 67 Cal. 2d 132, 145-46, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386, 429 P.2d 889, 898 (1967).
88. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 344-45, 60 P.2d 439, 452 (1936).
89. 13 Cal. 2d 424, 451-52, 90 P.2d 537, 550-51 (1939).
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California as well as extrajurisdictional authority. However, the right
will not be upheld in a particular case unless it is also consistent
with limitations expressed in article X, section 2 of the California
Constitution.
The riparian right of landowners in the Delta includes protection
from seawater incursion to the extent that such protection is reason-
able under the circumstances and could have been achieved under
natural river flow conditionsY0 Riparian landowners are thus entitled
to relief against upstream diverters with lower priority rights to
natural river flow if those upstream diversions cause substantial
injury, or are likely to cause such injury, to the riparian right.91 This
article demonstrates that an actionable injury to the riparian right
can include salinity incursion caused by upstream diverters. The
riparian right to salinity control is alive and well and living in
California.
90. This is because the riparian right of Delta landowners does not entitle them to water
from the projects which is not natural river flow. Stevinson W. Dist. v. Roduner, 36 Cal. 2d
264, 270, 223 P.2d 209, 213 (1950); Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 13 Cal. 2d 343, 90
P.2d 58 (1939). The State Water Resources Control Board has set water quality standards for
the state and federal projects to meet to protect Delta users. See S.W.R.C.B. Decision 1485,
(1978) (Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh). Standards were also set to protect
fish and wildlife. These standards were not intended to protect Delta riparian rights. Assuming
the Delta agricultural standards accurately portray Delta rights, then meeting those standards
would only give Delta users that to which they are entitled and would not violate constitutional
policy prohibiting waste of water.
91. The nature of the relief that would be granted is not addressed here. The fact that
the riparian right would be recognized and given some form of protection is important. Many
different forms of relief are available for injuries to the right. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo,
2 Cal. 2d 351, 374-78, 40 P.2d 486, 494-96 (1935) (owner entitled to compensation and
injunctive relief); W. HtrrcmNs, supra note 9, at 267-84.
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